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Abstract
Survey data suggests that in terms of wage rigidity the internal reference is more relevant
in US-type firms while external comparisons play a more significant role in European-type
firms. We generalize two theoretical approaches in efficiency framework to incorporate
both the internal and external perspectives as variables that affect individual effort
determination. Our framework suggests that the internal reference is essential for the
existence of wage rigidity while the external reference ensures an upward-slopping wage-
setting curve. It thus provides a modified efficiency wage model that is in line with
empirical findings of nominal wage rigidity for firms acting in various labor market
environments.
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11. Introduction
Standard efficiency wage models such as the shirking model by Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984), Akerlof’s (1982) partial gift exchange model and the adverse selection model by
Weiss (1980) can explain why firms set wages above market clearing levels so that
unemployment occurs in equilibrium. These models fail, however, to explain downward
rigid wages during a recession, when wages are almost constant as negative aggregate
shocks affect labor demand.1 To find out, why wages actually don’t fall, Bewley (1999)
interviewed more than 300 business executives, labor leaders, professional recruiters
and advisors to the unemployed. From his interviews he concluded that the workers’
morale is important for workers performance. The workers’ morale depends on being
treated fairly within firms – for instance by paying “fair” wages according to some
established internal pay structure. Concerning fairness comparisons with workers
outside the firm, Bewley (1999) reports that
“workers usually know so little about pay levels of other firms that pay differences
among firms have to be large before they affect worker attitudes.” (p. 106)
Campbell and Kamlani (1997) report that workers mainly compare their wages with
their own past wages, the wages of other workers within the firm, and with firms’
profits. These authors thus implicitly reject one of the essentials of efficiency wage
models, i.e. the comparison of the own wage with outside wages and outside options
when determining individual effort.
In efficiency wage models, in which workers compare their wage with external
wages only, the wage reaction is much more elastic than the employment reaction.
Negative shocks that shift labor demand inwards also affect the external reference wage
and thus induce workers to work harder, which in turn allows employers to cut wages.
Thus, wages are highly volatile over the business cycle – contrary to the empirical
1  Holden and Wulfsberg (2007) and Dickens et al (2007) report strong evidence for the existence of
nominal wage rigidity in 19 OECD countries.
2findings. To overcome this weakness, Danthine and Kurmann (2006) present a modified
version of the standard efficiency wage model, in which they replace the external by an
internal reference wage that is dependent on the firm’s output per worker. This internal
reference is a measure of rent-sharing and indicates how fair workers are treated within
firms. Their version of the efficiency model covers the reasons of Bewley’s interview
partners and exhibits a high degree of wage rigidity in a general equilibrium and even a
negative relation of wage and employment adjustments.
However, the neglect of an external reference is not in line with survey data
from Europe. Agell and Bennmarker (2003, 2007) report from a random survey of
Swedish human resource managers that two-thirds of their respondents believe that an
increase in external wages is detrimental to workers’ effort. Their results are in sharp
contrast to the results from US surveys:
“Most Swedish managers indicate that both internal and external wages are important
considerations in the local wage bargain.” (Agell and Bennmarker 2003, p. 25).
Unionization plays a leading role here since it increases workers’ knowledge about
external wages, which they may not be able to acquire in decentralized labor markets.2
Furthermore Agell and Bennmarker (2003) report that the external reference is more
important in larger firms and that the interest in external wages increases with the job
level (also see Andrews and Henry 1963). By contrast, they find little evidence that
unemployment benefit payments affect effort although they may be more important for
the low-end of the labor market.
To cover both the traditional external reference and the internal reference, we
develop a simple reduced-form general equilibrium efficiency wage model that allows
for both internal and external references to affect individual effort determination. It thus
enables us to reconcile the different survey results in a uniform framework. The internal
reference is modelled as a rent sharing within the firm while the external reference takes
into account the possibility of finding employment elsewhere or becoming unemployed.
2  In the same line Franz and Pfeiffer (2006) argue that the high degree of unionization may be one
explanation why the insider-outsider comparison is more important in German labor markets than in the
case of US labor markets.
3It turns out that wage rigidity is present even when the internal reference wage is given
only a moderate weight in the workers’ effort determination and that it is rather
insensitive to changes in the weight as long as both references play some role.
2. Model
The set-up of our framework is closely related to the model in Danthine and Kurmann
(2006) – DK in what follows. Firms use effective labor en  to produce output y, with e
denoting work effort and n the level of labor input. The production function is
?? )(enAy  with 10 ??? , where A  represents the level of technology and can be
interpreted as a shift parameter that reflects exogenous shocks. The price of the output
good is normalized to one. We consider homogenous workers who are willing to
provide effort according to the effort function
(1) ?????? rwwaae 10 ,
with 0a , 1a  and 10 ???  being positive constants (see Akerlof 1982, p. 561). The
firm’s wage is denoted by w, and the reference wage by rw .
According to DK, “workers appreciate their salary offer in light of the firm’s
output per employee ny /  and of their reservation wage b.” (DK, p. 280). Their
definition of the reference wage with which workers compare their wage when deciding
on their effort is
(DK) v
v
r bn
yw ??
?
?
?
?
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where 10 ?? v  is assumed to be exogenous. The first term represents the maximum
wage at which the entire rent is attributed to the worker. The second term denotes the
minimum wage below which the worker would prefer the outside option. The
reservation wage b is the minimum wage below which workers prefer to stay at home
and collect unemployment benefits. Since, in the DK-setting, this reservation wage is a
4constant share of the own wage, both terms actually reflect an internal reference and
rule out any external wage comparisons.
External references, however, should be considered for at least the following
four reasons. First, unionization increases labor market transparency and facilitates
external wage comparisons. Second, larger firms also seem to be more exposed to
external comparisons. Third, external reference importance rises with job level. Fourth,
at the lower-end wage scale the comparison unemployment benefit payments become an
external reference since unemployment benefit payments for low-wage jobs are
normally bounded from below, and actually become independent of the own previous
wage.
Defining the reservation wage of the worker in the usual way (see e.g. Nickell
and Layard 1999), the component b should depend on the wage workers obtain if
rehired by another firm, on the probability of reemployment, and on the level of
unemployment benefits. Using the same functional form as suggested by Akerlof (1982,
p. 561) for the external reference wage component and denoting w  as the equilibrium
wage, n  as the equilibrium employment rate, and b  as the exogenously given
unemployment benefit payment, we can define the external component as a geometric
average nnbwb ?? 1  so that the reference wage can be expressed as
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The firm maximizes profit by maximizing wnenA ??? ?)(  with respect to the wage
rate and the employment level subject to the workers’ effort function (1) and the
reference wage (2). The profit maximization with respect to employment yields
(3) )1( ,nen
yw ???? ,
where enenne /, ??  denotes the effort elasticity with respect to employment. Using (3),
profit maximization with respect to the wage rate yields newe ,,1 ???? , where
5ewewwe /, ??  is the effort elasticity with respect to the wage rate. If the internal
reference wage is relevant, a marginal wage increase reduces employment, which in turn
increases the reference wage via the consequent rise in ny / . “Thus, ceteris paribus, the
last wage increase warranted in the external reference case would not pay for itself in
the internal reference context.” (DK, p. 281). Adding an internal reference thus requires
modifying the Solow condition.
While the wage-setting curve in the DK model does not depend on aggregate
employment anymore, the wage curve in the modified setting does. Under the
assumption of a constant replacement ratio wb ?? , ,10 ???  applying the symmetric
equilibrium conditions ww ? , nn ? , the modified Solow condition, and the reference
wage (2) gives the following optimal effort level
(4)
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With equilibrium effort being determined by (4), the production function then implies
that the modified aggregate wage-setting curve is given by
(5) ??
??
? ?? 1
)1)(1(1
n
ACw
v
vn
v
,
where ? ? v
v
v
v
a
a
C ??
???
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
? )1(
)1(1
1
1
0
1
 is a constant. Figure 1 illustrates the wage
setting curves for different weights of the internal reference, described by v , and two
different replacement ratios of 33 and 67 percent. The model is calibrated for a wage
share of 2/3, and an equilibrium wage equal to 2,000 Euro for all weights when
aggregate unemployment is exactly at 10 percent.3
3 The parameter values are as follows: 1.;095.990;1000;1 10 ????? aaA .
6Figure 1: The wage setting curve for different weights of the internal reference
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If comparisons are mainly external (e.g. 1.?v ), the wage setting curve is relatively
steep. The more important the internal reference becomes, however, the less steep the
wage curve becomes: firms prefer employment adjustments to wage adjustments or, in
other words: wages become more rigid. If the reference is almost internal ( 9.?v ),
wages may even fall with employment.4 A higher replacement ratio will also flatten the
wage-setting curve. This effect is the more pronounced, the more the external reference
matters.
Formally, the general equilibrium wage elasticity with respect to employment,
obtained from (5), cannot be signed unambiguously as we have
(6) ??????
?
? ln)1()1( n
v
v
w
n
n
w .
Condition (6) indicates that the degree of wage rigidity depends on the weight of the
internal reference v . To see this, consider the two extreme cases. The limiting case
0?v  in equation (2) represents the standard efficiency wage model with an external
reference wage only and therefore a high variability of the efficiency wage. In this case,
the reference wage reduces to nnr bww
?? 1  and the wage elasticity becomes
unambiguously positive
4  The concavity of the production function ensures that for given effort the internal reference ny /  is
declining in employment.
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(cf. DK, equation (13)). For an unemployment rate of 10 percent ( 9.?n ) and a
replacement ratio 67.?? , the wage reaction is almost four times as high as the
employment adjustment. By contrast, if we disregard the labor market conditions in the
reference wage by setting 0?n  in equation (2), the model boils down to the model by
DK and the elasticity of the wage with respect to employment becomes unambiguously
negative:
(8) 0)1(
0
????
?
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?nw
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n
w
(cf. equation (15) of DK). A comparison of (7) and (8) highlights the interpretation of
the more general case as represented in (6). Rewriting (6) as
(9) ? ????????
?
? ln)1()1(1 nv
vw
n
n
w .
shows that an increase in the parameter ? v  i) lowers the level of the elasticity and ii)
shifts the weight of the two perspectives and thus becomes decisive for the degree of
observed wage rigidity: the more important the internal reference relative to the external
view becomes, the more rigid wages react to exogenous demand shocks.
Table 1: wage elasticity and the weight of the internal reference
Weight of the internal reference for different replacement ratios
.1 .3 .4 .5 ??? ??? ???
Unem-
ployment
rate .33 .67 .33 .67 .33 .67 .33 .67 .33 .67 .33 .67 .33 .67
5.0% 9.06 3.13 2.10 .57 1.23 .24 .71 .05 ???? ?.08 ???? ?.17 ????? ?.29
10.0% 8.57 2.95 1.97 .52 1.15 .21 .66 .03 ???? ?.09 ???? ?.18 ????? ?.29
20.0% 7.58 2.59 1.73 .42 .99 .15 .55 ?.01 ???? ?.12 ???? ?.19 ????? ?.30
The numerical examples in table 1 illustrate for the same assumptions as made in figure
1 that the degree of wage rigidity increases with the weight given to the internal
reference, falls with the replacement ratio, but this result is rather insensitive to the
8actual labor market performance. Strong wage rigidity is observed when the internal and
external references are almost equally important for individual effort determination: a
reduction of the unemployment rate by 9 percent, starting at 9.?n , changes the wage
by 0.66 percent when the replacement ratio is low and by 0.03 percent when the
replacement ratio is high. For intermediate values of the internal reference weight, we
may not observe much difference in the degree of wage rigidities among countries with
different labor market institutions. This conclusion is very much in line with Knoppik
and Beissinger (2005, p. 14) who do not find conclusive empirical evidence for
systematic differences between Europe and the US with respect to downward nominal
wage rigidity. By contrast, Dickens et al (2007) findings that wages are more rigid in
Europe than in the US may be due to more general unemployment benefit systems.
3. Conclusion
The aim of this note was to highlight the role both internal and external references play
in an efficiency wage framework. Our reduced-form generalized efficiency wage model
allows us to disentangle these two perspectives. It is open to the way in which the
external reference affects the wage setting of firms. It may be due to reciprocity in a gift
exchange or due to an explicit comparison with outside wages in e.g. more unionized
sectors. The former channel has been analyzed in a very innovative new paper by
Danthine and Kurmann (2007) who consider reciprocity in an efficiency wage
framework. There, the external reference is not needed to determine the penalty for
those caught shirking but to determine a minimum wage above which the firms’ wage
offers are only considered a gift in exchange for effort. Although they model a purely
internal gift exchange, the external reference, which is essential for creating
unemployment in efficiency wage models, still serves as a benchmark. Their results are
very similar to ours though the focus is somehow different. Our model is more open to
how internal and external references determine the reference wage and may be more
tractable, while their model provide a eloquent micro-foundation of reciprocity in the
9efficiency wage framework. Both models capture the essence of standard efficiency
models that firms will set the wage above market clearing level to promote effort and
allow for a strong degree of wage rigidity as long as the internal wage comparison is
non-negligible.
In so far the reference wage is a weighted average of internal and external
components our model also allows for differences as suggested by the survey data for
the US and Europe and would predict that wage rigidity is more pronounced in labor
markets where internal references matter more – although the differences might be very
small. Gathering firm-specific data concerning the earnings per worker and aggregate
data concerning average wages, unemployment and the generosity of the unemployment
benefit system may help to empirically estimate the relative weights of internal and
external references. This has to be delegated to further research.
References
Agell, J. and H. Bennmarker, 2003. Endogenous wage rigidity, CESifo Working Paper
No 1081, November.
Agell, J. and H. Bennmarker, 2007. Wage incentives and wage rigidity: a representative
view from within, Labour Economics 14, 347-369.
Andrews, I. R. and M. M. Henry, 1963. Management attitudes toward pay, Industrial
Relation 3, 29-39.
Akerlof, G. A., 1982. Labor contracts as partial gift exchange. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 97, 543–569.
Bewley, T. F., 1999. Why Wages Don’t Fall During A Recession. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge.
Blinder, A. S. and D. H. Choi, 1990. A shred of evidence on theories of wage stickiness,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 1003-1015.
Campbell C. M. and K. S. Kamlani, 1997. The reasons for wage rigidity: evidence from
a survey of firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 759-789.
Danthine, J. P. and A. Kurmann, 2006. Efficiency wages revisited: the internal reference
perspective. Economics Letters 90, 278-284.
Danthine, J. P. and A. Kurmann, 2007. The macroeconomic consequences of reciprocity
in labor relations. Forthcoming in Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Dickens, W. T. et al., 2007. How wages change: micro evidence from the international
wage flexibility project, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21.2, 195-214.
Franz, W. and F. Pfeiffer, 2006. Reasons for wage rigidity in Germany, IZA Discussion
Paper No. 2017, March.
Holden, S. and F. Wulfsberg, 2007. Downward nominal wage rigidity in the OECD,
European Central Bank Working Paper No 777, July 2007.
10
Knoppik, C. and T. Beissinger, 2005. Downward nominal wage rigidity in Europe: an
analysis of European micro data from the ECHP 1994-2001, IZA Discussion
Paper No. 1492, February.
Nickell, S. and R. Layard, 1999. Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance,
in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.). Handbook of Labor Economic Vol. 3C,
Elsevier: Amsterdam et al., 3029-3084.
Shapiro C. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1984. Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline
device, American Economic Review 74, 433-444.
Weiss, A. 1980. Job queues and layoffs in labor markets with flexible wages, Journal of
Political Economy 88, 526-538.
